This paper describes how to perform contract signature in a fair way using quantum information. The protocol proposed permits two partners, users of a communication network, to perform a contract signature based on the RSA security. The authentication of the signers is based on the use of a non-local XOR function of two classical bits.
Introduction
Contract signature is an important part of security information area with many practical applications.
The main goal is to provide a mechanism in which two participants can exchange a sequence of bits, representing their signatures, in a fair way, that is, one of them will send his/her signature only if he/she is sure that will also receive the partner' signature. Hence, a good contract signature protocol must guarantee fairness for both signers.
In this paper, we propose a model for contract signature using quantum information. The protocol proposed is based on the non-local XOR function between two classical bits. This work is outlined as follows: Section 2 describes how to implement the non-local XOR function between two classical bits; Section 3 shows the protocols for quantum contract signature; at last, conclusions are presented in Section 4.
(2) (3) Considering A , B and C as the individual parts of the total state | , the non-local XOR function between two classical bits, represented by K (belonging to Alice) and R (belonging to Bob) can be achieved using the quantum circuit shown in Fig. 1 .
In Fig. 1 Alice measures qubit D and she sends her result to Charlie using one classical bit.
Bob measures qubit E and he sends his result to Charlie using another classical bit. 
Contract signature protocol
The proposed contract signature protocol is strongly based on the non-local XOR function discussed in Section 2. Alice and Bob are the contractors and Charlie is the arbitrator that works as a TTP (trustable third part). This problem has some particularities:
Proper signature: Alice and Bob's signatures are related to the contract, that is, a signature is a function of the contract. This means that the usual idea of accessing a database in order to get a signature (using, for instance, a Key Distribution Center -KDC) is not considered in this work. Basically, the proposed protocol has three stages:
The initialization: when Alice and Bob choose their signatures;
Simultaneous message passing: when Charlie receives the information of both parties that will be passed to the respective parties using the non-local XOR function;
The validation: when, finally, Alice and Bob obtain the counterpart signature in a non-secure scenario (for instance, if neither Alice nor Bob trust each other), both can evaluate the information received and to send to Charlie the confirmation, or not, of the validity of the data.
In the protocol proposed, we consider that Alice and Bob use the RSA algorithm [2] in order to create their signatures. The security of RSA is based on the intractability of integer factorization using classical computers. Briefly, two large prime numbers p and q are chosen generating n = p q and z = (p -1) (q -1).
Then, a prime number d relative to z is chosen and it is calculated a number e such that e d = 1 mod z. Initialization stage:
1. First of all, Alice (A) and Bob (B) agree with a specific contract that is represented by a message m. This contract is not required to be secret and, for our purposes, it is managed by Charlie (playing the role of a TTP). 4. Charlie sends s AB to Alice and Bob. Since Charlie is not one of the interested parties, he can be considered neutral and that he will, in fact, to send the same information to both signers.
The validation stage:
5. Now, having s AB , A and B can get the value of the counterpart signature performing a XOR operation between s AB and their own signatures. In this way, Alice knows which bits she has to flip in her signature in order to transform it in Bob's one. Similarly, Bob obtains Alice' signature. In order to check the security let us consider two situations: 1) Alice claims that Bob has sent a false signature and Bob has, in fact, sent a false signature. 2) Alice claims that Bob has sent a false signature but Bob sent the correct one. The actions of Charlie for both cases are: 
Conclusions
In this work, it was presented a scheme for contract signature using quantum information. Basically, the signatures are generated according the contract to be considered and the simultaneous exchange of information is done using the non-local XOR function between two classical bits. The protocol is also based in the RSA algorithm and considers that Charlie is a TTP responsible to send the XOR information between the parties. At last, it was presented a security analysis that permits Charlie to verify if one of the parties sent a false signature or lied saying the partner have done it. In the first case the contract is cancelled while in the last case it remains valid. Moreover, penalties can be applied to the user that was caught cheating.
